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Abstract
Primary school enrolment rates are continuously low in many developing countries. The
main explanation in the economic literature on schooling is focused on credit constraints
and child labour, implying that the indirect cost of schooling in terms of foregone earnings
is too high. This paper investigates the e¤ects of future income uncertainty on sibling
dependence in the schooling decisions of rural households in developing countries. Schooling
tends to direct skills towards future urban employment, whereas traditional rural education
or on-farm learning-by-doing tends to direct skills towards future agricultural employment.
Given this dichtomy, the question is then: Does future income uncertainty inuence the
joint educational choice made by parents on behalf of their children and is it possible
to test this on simple cross-sectional data? I extend a simple human capital portfolio
model to a three period setting. This allows me to explore the natural sequentiality in the
schooling decision of older and younger siblings. The model can generate testable empirical
implications, which can be taken to any standard cross-sectional data set. I nd empirical
evidence of negative sibling dependence in the educational decision, which is consistent
with a human capital portfolio theory of risk diversication and which cannot be explained
by sibling rivalry over scarce resources for credit constrained households. The paper thus
provides a complementary explanation to why enrolment rates in developing countries are
often continuously low.
Keywords: Schooling, human capital investment, specic human capital, sibling dependency, old-age
security, uncertainty, risk and income source diversication, liquidity constraints, Tanzania, Africa.
JEL codes: J13, J24, O15
Contact: hbl@r¤.dk. I am grateful for valuable suggestions to Martin Browning, Mette Ejrnæs, João Ejarque,
Fane Groes, Bo Honoré and seminar participants at Centre for Applied Microeconometrics (Copenhagen), and
University of Århus. All interpretations and errors are mine.
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1 Introduction
Primary school enrolment rates are continuously low in many developing countries. The main
explanation in the economic literature on schooling is focused on credit constraints and child
labour, implying that the indirect cost of schooling in terms of foregone earnings is too high,
see Edmonds (2007) and Lilleør (2008) for a detailed literature review. Government policies
focusing on lowering the direct costs of schooling in terms of tuition fees, availability of books
and uniforms might ameliorate the problem, but if high indirect costs are the main reason
for low enrolment rates, such policies will not be enough to overcome the household budget
constraint. In Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in rural areas where household-based production
systems dominate the agricultural sector, the concept of foregone earnings of sending children to
school becomes more vague and, more importantly, on-farm child work may itself be an essential
component of traditional education, a possible alternative to formal schooling, as suggested
by Rodgers and Standing (1981), Bekombo (1981), Grootaert and Kanbur (1995), and more
recently and in more detail by Bock (2002). Furthermore, rural areas su¤er from missing capital
and pension markets, generating a need for informal insurance and savings mechanisms to shield
consumption against income failure and secure old-age subsistence. Liquidity constraints and
high foregone earnings of child labour may therefore not be the only explanations for low
enrolment rates in primary schools.
In this paper, I argue that the rural-urban divide and uncertainty about future income of
children, upon which parents rely for old-age security, combined with the fact that most children
have siblings and parents are therefore likely to make a joint human capital investment decision
regarding all their children, can make it optimal for parents to send some, but not all, of their
children to school. Lack of schooling might therefore not only be due to cost side constraints
in the human capital investment decision, but could also be due to uncertainties about the
return side. However, the vast majority of papers on child labour and schooling focus on the
cost side of the human capital investment decision (Edmonds (2007)), and on the role of child
labour when households are exposed to transitory income shocks, e.g. Jacoby and Skouas
(1997), Jensen (2000) and Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2006). This paper contributes to the
existing literature by focusing on the uncertainty associated with the future returns of the
human capital investment decision. The purpose being to complement the exisiting, and by
all means valid, cost side explanations for child labour with an additional explanation that,
given the empirical ndings, sheds new light on the human capital investment decisions faced
by parents in rural areas.
Most developing countries have a large agricultural sector and a somewhat smaller urban
sector. There will always be uncertainty about future income in both of these sectors, but the
uncertainties across sectors may largely be uncorrelated. As long as schooling tends to direct
children towards future urban sector employment, and on-farm child work or learning-by-doing
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is thought of as a traditional way of educating a child for future employment in the agricultural
sector, then it can be shown that enough uncertainty about future income can prevent full
school enrolment among siblings, even in a world with perfect credit markets. Missing capital
markets can thus inuence parental choice of schooling in two additional ways, apart from the
standard credit constraint argument. First, income source diversication becomes an important
means of income smoothing, as Morduch (1995) puts it, for households to minimise the risk of
complete income failure both at present and in the future. Second, children play an important
role of being old-age pension providers for their parents, since both private and public pension
schemes are very limited. Future earnings and future income source diversication of children
therefore become important for parents to secure their old-age subsistence.
Using a simple two-period human capital portfolio model for the joint educational decision
of siblings, I show that future income uncertainty can indeed have a negative e¤ect on the
proportion of siblings in school. Model calibrations show that the negative e¤ect can be sur-
prisingly large even for moderate levels of uncertainty. Although model calibrations are based
on simple data moments, the ndings give some indications of the importance of uncertainty in
the human capital investment decision. A logical extension would be to estimate the e¤ect of
future uncertainty on the actual proportion of children in school. However, it is, by denition,
very di¢ cult to get a good measure of future uncertainty, and thus virtually impossible to
identify the actual e¤ect of uncertainty on the optimal human capital portfolio of children in
a household. An alternative is therefore to nd other implications of the inuence of future
income uncertainty on the joint schooling decision which can be estimated in data and which
cannot be caused by any other observationally equivalent explanations. One possibility is to
take advantage of the natural sequentiality in schooling between younger and older siblings.
The two-period model is therefore extended to a three-period model, which yields direct impli-
cations for the nature of sibling dependency caused by risk diversication and di¤erent from
sibling dependency caused by sibling rivalry over scarce resources, as suggested by Morduch
(2000). The three period model allows for younger and older cohorts of siblings and analyses
the e¤ect of schooling of the older cohort on the younger one. Lack of schooling due to child
labour or credit constraints result in a positive relationship between the schooling of the older
and younger siblings, because the older cohort generate income when the school fees of the
younger cohort have to be paid. However, lack of schooling due to risk diversication result in
a negative relationship between the older and younger cohorts within a household, even when
credit markets are perfect. Calibrating, and partly simulating, the three period model yields
testable empirical implications, which can be taken to standard cross-sectional data set with-
out any requirements about only observing households with completed fertility and completed
schooling among their children.
Based on a nation-wide large scale cross-sectional household survey undertaken in Tanzania
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in 1994, I nd evidence of sibling dependency consistent with risk diversication having a strong
inuence on the joint human capital investment decision of sons, but not of daughters. Results
are considerably stronger among rural households compared to urban households. These results
are consistent with the fact that most societies in Tanzania are patrilineal and therefore only
sons are of importance for old-age security, and with the fact that only rural households have
a credible option of educating their children traditionally through on-farm learning by doing.
Sibling dependence in the schooling decision might therefore not only be caused by sibling
rivalry for scarce resources, but can also be due to a need for risk management by diversifying
future income sources. This has direct implications for educational policies, since lack of
enrolment might not only be a matter of costs of schooling, but also of content in terms of a
relevant curricula for future employment in the agricultural sector. In fact, when questioned
about which subjects should be taught in primary schools, parents invariably allocate top rank
to a course in technical skills for agriculture and business, indicating a demand for skills
diversication in formal education.
In section 2 the theoretical framework is outlined describing both the two-period model and
the three-period extension as well as the results of the model calibrations. Data is described in
section 3, whereas section 4 has a description of the empirical specication used for estimation,
and the empirical results are analysed and discussed. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
The model developed in this section di¤ers from most of the models in the existing literature
in two ways. First, the model is not a one parent-one child model of human capital investment,
but rather a one parent-N children model thus allowing for dependency among siblings in the
joint human capital investment decisions of the parents. Second, the model introduces future
income uncertainty, which means uncertainty about the returns to education. A matter which,
despite the importance for the investment decision, has largely been ignored in the literature1.
The two period model is a direct replication of the two period model in Lilleør (2008). The
contribution of this paper is the extension to a three period model, which generates testable
empirical predictions that can be taken directly to any standard cross sectional data set.
In the following section, the basic two-period model set-up gives a general understanding of
how uncertainty can a¤ect the human capital investment allocation. The model is calibrated
using information from a nationwide large-scale household survey in Tanzania in section 2.2.
The three period model is laid out in section 2.3 and calibration results are described in section
2.4.
1Two exceptions are recent papers by Pouliot (2005) and by Estevan and Baland (2007)
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2.1 The basic two-period model
The model is a two period unitary household model, where parents function as a unied sole
decision maker. There is no discounting of the future and no interest rate on savings or credit.
In the rst period, parents earn agricultural income Y1; which they allocate between rst period
household consumption c1, savings s; and the education expenses for their N children. N is
assumed to be exogenously given, since the emphasis here is not on the e¤ect of uncertainty
on fertility decisions, but on the e¤ect of uncertainty on the joint human capital investment
decision of children, given the fertility of the household.2
There are two types of education in the model, general formal education achieved through
primary schooling and specic traditional education achieved through on-farm learning-by-
doing. Traditional education directs children towards future employment in the agricultural
sector (a), whereas formal education directs children towards future employment in the non-
agricultural urban sector (b) in the second period. Parents thus face a discrete choice for each
of the N children of whether he or she should be educated traditionally or formally. A child can
only receive one type of education3. In the second period, traditionally educated children earn
agricultural income, ya2 , whereas formally educated children earn urban income, y
b
2: Second
period income of children in the agricultural sector will be a function of the rst period parental
income under the assumption that children will be working in similar agricultural production
systems as their parents, and parents transfer specic human capital skills to their children as
part of their traditional education. Thus ya2 = f(Y1); f
0(Y1) > 0:
Parents do not generate any income in the second period, but rely fully on their savings
and the joint agricultural and urban income transfers from their N children for second period
household consumption, c2. Second period income is uncertain. Parents therefore maximise a
joint von Neuman-Morgenstern expected utility function dened over and separable in house-
hold consumption, ct, where t = 1; 2: The utility function is assumed to be concave, such that
U 0(c) > 0 and U 00(c) < 0: The household solves the following maximisation problem
max
;s
EW (c1; c2) = U(c1) + EU(c2) (1)
subject to the budget constraints for period 1 and period 2, respectively
c1 = Y1   (1  )Nea   Neb   s (2)
c2 = N
 ((1  )Nya2 + Nyb2) + s
2 It is conceivable that the fertility decision and the human capital investment decision of the born and unborn
children are both inuenced by the parentspreference for old-age security, which suggests modelling the two
decisions jointly. However, to keep things simple, I focus on the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the human
capital investment decision of children conditional on the household having completed their fertility.
3This is a simplifying assumption. The choice here is not on how many hours a child spends in school or
working, but rather whether he or she graduates with full primary school education or not.
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where  is the proportion of children, which parents have chosen to educate formally through
schooling. That is,  is the portfolio allocation of children between traditional and formal
human capital investments. The number of children who receive schooling in the rst period is
thus given by N and the number who are educated within the traditional agricultural based
system is (1 )N .4 The total amount of educational expenses is (1 )Nea+Neb; where ea
is the educational expenditure for each child in traditional education, e.g. supervisional costs
of parents, and eb is the educational expenditure for each child in formal education, e.g. tuition
fees and uniform costs. Educational expenditures are allowed to di¤er over the two sectors,
and they are considered both non-negative.5
Savings can be negative, and both the discount rate and the interest rate are normalised to
unity and are thus explicitly left out of the model for simplicity. By assuming perfect credit
markets, I can ignore any e¤ect of liquidity constraints on the schooling decision and thus focus
on the e¤ect of future income uncertainty on the joint human capital portfolio decision of all
N children in the household. The question is: can this alone result in less than full school
enrolment among siblings, i.e. a model prediction of  < 1 solely due to uncertainty.
Second period consumption will equal any capital transfers from period one in terms of
savings or dissavings, s plus a fraction, 1=N; of total income of all children, which is given
by the income of children in the agricultural sector (1   )Nya2 ; and the income of children
in the urban sector Nyb2. Children are thus assumed to transfer a certain fraction of their
income to their parents. The fraction is the same for all children, irrespective of their sector of
employment, but it depends on their number of siblings for  > 0: In principle,  2 [0; 1]; but
in the following I will assume that  2]0; 1[ to ensure that there is a positive, but diminishing
marginal e¤ect of having more children on second period income. When  = 0, children share
all their income with their parents. When  = 1 children share only a fraction 1=N of their
income with their parents, resulting in parents receiving the equivalent of one full income from
their children in total. If there is only one child in the household that child will be the sole
breadwinner of the family in the second period and is forced to share his/her full income with
the parents, irrespective of the size of :
Parents are faced with two choice variables; how much to save or dissave s; and which
proportion of their children to educate formally through schooling . The rst order condition
with respect to s is
U 0(c1) = EU 0(c2) (3)
4For analytical simplicity,  is written as continuous in the theoretical model, but it will be treated as discrete
in the calibrations and in the empirical model.
5While the literature on child labour and schooling generally set ea as negative and thus as a source of income,
I here follow Bock (2002) in stating that the overall learning potential in the tasks completed by children in
agriculture is higher than the immediate return. If children were only undertaking tasks with no learning, but
high immediate output, such as fetching water or rewoods, there would be no transfer of farm-specic human
capital from parents to children and therefore no future agricultural return from such activities.
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That is, savings s will be chosen such that marginal utility in period one equals the expected
marginal utility of period two. The rst order condition with respect to  is given by equation
(4), where  is the optimal solution for the maximisation problem above
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for 0 <  < 1
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) > E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for  = 0
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) < E[N1 (yb2   ya2)U 0(c2)]; for  = 1
(4)
where
E[N1 (yb2 ya2)U 0(c2)] = E(N1 (yb2 ya2))EU 0(c2)+cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) cov(N1 ya2 ; U 0(c2))
Uncertainty about second period income results in two covariance terms, both negative, between
the second period income variables, ya2 and y
b
2, and marginal utility, U
0(c2). These terms will,
when they are strong enough, pull the optimal portfolio allocation,  away from each of the
two corner solutions. Uncertainty in the agricultural sector will have a positive e¤ect on 
because it will increase the right hand side of the rst order consition for  and pull towards
the  = 1 corner solution. Uncertainty in the urban sector, on the other hand, will have a
negative e¤ect on  because it will decrease the right hand side of the the rst order condition
for  and thus pull towards the  = 0 corner solution.
In the following, I assume that there is no covariant uncertainty between second period
income from children in the urban sector and children in the agricultural sector. This allows
me to simplify the problem by normalising uncertainty about income from the agricultural
sector to zero, and thus solely focus on the e¤ect of uncertainty of urban income on the
optimal proportion of children in formal schooling. Going back to the rst order condition
for ; equation (4), this means concentrating on the covariance term, which can reduce the
right-hand side of the rst order condition and thus reduce the optimal : That is, focusing
on the somewhat more relevant question of what can result in an optimal  below 1, rather
than what can result in an optimal  above 0.
This is not to say that there is no uncertainty in the agricultural sector, but rather that
uncertainty associated with income transfers from distant migrant children in the urban sector
is higher. These migrant children may face higher income levels, but also relatively more
variation, since the urban labour market entails a risk of unemployment, which is not present
among subsistence farmers in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, parents may also perceive
the size and the frequency of income transfers from urban migrant children to be more uncertain
compared to the daily support and in-kind assistance from home children engaged in local
agricultural sector6.
6The uncertainty could thus also, in e¤ect, be an intergenerational agency problem between parents and
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The uncertainty, that parents face about income transfers from migrant children in the
urban sector is modelled as a simple mean-preserving spread. Each migrant child can either
get a good (typically formal sector) job or not, where the probability of a good draw in the
urban labour market is given by p = 0:5. Migrant children in good jobs have an urban income
of yb2 = +", whereas migrant children without good jobs have an urban income of y
b
2 =  ":7
This means that second period urban income is given by
yb2 =
(
+ "
  "
w.p.
w.p.
p = 0:5
(1  p) = 0:5
The mean and the variance for each child in the urban sector is E(yb2) =  and V ar(y
b
2) = "
2:
Given this specication of uncertainty, the rst order condition for  rewrites (4) as
N(eb   ea)U 0(c1) = N1 (  ya2)EU 0(c2) + cov[N1 yb2; U 0(c2)]  0
where the specication of the covariance term will depend on the degree of risk correlation
in the urban labour market outcome. The expected total income transfers from all the N
children, which have gone to the urban sector, is simply E(N1 yb2) = N1 ; independent
of the degree of risk correlation among migrant siblings. But the variance of their expected
total income, V ar(N1 yb2) and the covariance above, cov(N1 yb2; U 0(c2)) will both depend
on the degree of risk correlation in urban income.
I consider the two extremes where income transfers from siblings in urban employment are
either perfectly correlated or uncorrelated. Reality is likely to lie somewhere in between. When
there is perfect risk correlation among siblings in urban employment, all siblings will either have
a good draw and then their income transfers will amount to N1 (+"); or they will all have
a bad draw and then their income transfers will amount to N1 (  "), hence the variance
is V ar(N1 yb2) = 2N2 2"2 . When there is no risk correlation among siblings, they all
face the same urban labour market lottery irrespective of the labour market outcomes of their
siblings. The variance under no risk correlation is thus smaller and depends on the binomial
coe¢ cient
 
N
i

, where i denotes the number of successful siblings in the urban labour market
(i.e. those where yb2 = + ") and N is the total number of siblings in the urban sector in the
second period, V ar(N1 yb2) = N 
NP
i=0
 
N
i

1
2N
(i"  (N   i)")2 = N1 "2:
migrant children. Their degree of success is harder to monitor and lack of family control increases with the
distance. Social sanctions are often mentioned as e¤ective means in overcoming such agency problems and
thereby helping to reduce at least one source of future uncertainty. Lassen and Lilleør (2008) analyse the e¤ect
of such sanctions on the demand for formal schooling.
7 I do not explicitly consider a mortality risk of young adults as in Estevan and Baland (2007). However, the
model could easily be extended to include such risk, but if mortality risk is exogenous to choice of education, it
would simply just add a higher level of uncertainty in both the agricultural and urban sector. The qualitative
ndings of the model would not change.
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As long as uncertainty in the agricultural sector and the urban sector do not covary, house-
holds will have an incentive to diversify their human capital investments to reduce future risk
exposure. For a given set of preferences, it can be shown that, once the optimal choice of  and
s have been found by solving the two rst order conditions, the derivative of  with respect
to " is negative. If the need for diversication is strong enough, that is if " is large enough, it
will have a negative impact on the proportion of children sent to school in the optimal human
capital portfolio of the household.
2.2 Calibrations
Although it is possible to show analytically, that the partial derivative of  with respect to
" is negative. This does not indicate whether existing levels of uncertainty in urban income
alone can result in less than full enrolment. Only by calibrating the model, using actual levels
of school expenditures and income in both the agricultural and urban sector, is it possible
to determine whether the actual dispersion in urban income, V ar(yb2) = "
2; could potentially
keep some children out of school purely due to future income or risk diversication, even under
perfect credit markets.
The model is calibrated for the average household using simple data moments based on the
table of summary statistics (table 1 in section 3), and constant relative risk aversion preferences
with a risk aversion parameter of  = 2:8 Rural and urban income are proxied by rural and
urban household expenditure measures of 0.707 and 1.247 USD, respectively. First period
parental income and second period agricultural income are normalised to unity Y1 = ya2 =
1, the spread of second period agricultural income is normalised to zero, and second period
urban income and spread are adjusted accordingly, resulting in yb2 = 1:26=0:708 = 1:780 and
" = (1:218   0:501)=0:708 = 1:013. Schooling expenditures (eb), including annual uniform
expenses, amount to 2.5 per cent of parental income, expenses associated with educating the
children traditionally are simply set at half, i.e. ea = 0:0125.9
Figure 1 shows the pure e¤ect of future urban income uncertainty " on the optimal pro-
portion of siblings educated formally  for N = 1; 3; 5; and 7 children, respectively10. The
discrete jumps in the graph stem from the discrete number of children. For instance, when
" 2 [1:1; 1:6] a household with three children (green line) will only be sending one out of the
three to school under perfect correlation in "s. On average, the sample of households have 5-6
children in rural areas.
8For additional calibration results on the two-period model, please refer to Lilleør (2008).
9The parameter values di¤er from those of Lilleør (2008) because a di¤erent and smaller sample is used.
I only include households which have both children of school age and children beyond school age in order to
resemble the three period model as closely as possible. However, this does not change the qualitative ndings
of the calibrations.
10For a simpler version of gure 1, refer to gure 0 in Lilleør (2008).
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(Figure 1)
It is clear from gure 1 that future uncertainty, the level of which is proxied by actual levels
of income spread, can indeed result in households diversifying their human capital investments.
For the average household with ve children, an " = 1 (which corresponds to the standard
deviation of the average income level in data) results in a predicted interval of  of [0.6;1] and
likewise the actual enrolment rate of  = 0:7 corresponds to an optimal human capital portfolio
when future urban income uncertainty is in the interval of " = [0:9; 1:7]. Both intervals include
the observed values in the data. These are the predictions based on a model of perfect credit
markets, the less than full school enrolment is thus purely a result of risk diversication and not
in any way driven by sibling rivalry over resources. Adding credit constraints (s  0) and child
labour (ea =  0:025) to the calibrations shift the graphs inwards towards the origin, resulting
in even lower optimal levels of , see gure 2. Now the actual enrolment rate of  = 0:7
corresponds to an interval of uncertainty of " = [0:3; 1:2]: Without uncertainty (" = 0), the
model predicts that the optimal schooling rate for households with ve children is 0.8, which is
slightly above the actual enrolment rates. This enrolment rate is a pure e¤ect of sibling rivalry
in the constrained household, but any further reduction due to uncertainty (" > 0) is an e¤ect
of sibling portfolio dependence in the need for risk diversication.
(Figure 2)
From these two gures it is di¢ cult to determine whether sibling dependence is primarily
caused by sibling rivalry over scarce resources or by the need to diversify future income sources
and their associated risk. Both explanations can generate model predictions consistent with
simple data moments and the two e¤ects are likely to co-exist. The point of this exercise is
not to question the importance of liquidity constraints and scarcity of resources in the human
capital investment decisions of the household, but to emphasise that liquidity constraints and
child labour might not be the full explanation for lack of schooling.
2.3 A Three Period Model
The two-period model is appealing for its simplicity, the negative e¤ect of future income un-
certainty on the human capital portfolio decision of the parents is immediate. Unfortunately,
the model does not lend itself very easily to cross sectional data or even standard panel data,
because the time span would be too short to cover the two periods in question. However, one
of the key aspects of the model is the prediction that households will tend to diversify future
income sources if there is enough uncertainty about future income. This need for diversica-
tion can spill over into the schooling choice today and create potential for a negative sibling
dependence in schooling; a negative dependence, which is not generated by constraint e¤ects
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due to sibling rivalry for currently scarce resources, but purely driven by the need for risk
diversication in the human capital portfolio of siblings. The challenge then becomes to test
for negative sibling depence in schooling without implicitly testing for a liquidity constraint.
This can be done by exploring the natural sequentiality in the schooling decision of siblings
and looking at two di¤erent cohorts of siblings within a household. The older cohort, who have
completed schooling will be generating income and is therefore able to contribute resources
to the household rather than demand them. That is, all else equal, households with older
economically active siblings will have less of a binding liquidity constraint than households
without. This in itself should have a positive e¤ect on schooling if households are liquidity
constrained. On the other hand, if the proportion of formally educated older siblings is higher
than the optimal overall proportion of formally educated children in the household , then
this is likely to have a negative e¤ect on the proportion of formally educated younger siblings
for the desired future income source diversication to be achieved.
By extending the model to a three period model, it becomes possible to analyse how exactly
the portfolio allocation of the older siblings should a¤ect the portfolio allocation of the younger
ones. This will have direct empirical implications, which can be tested in the cross sectional
data as long as there are enough households with children both of and beyond school age. The
three period model is set up such that older siblings are educated in the rst period and work
in the second and third period. Younger siblings are educated in the second period and only
work in the third period. Parents generate income in the rst and the second period, but not
in the third period, where they have reached old age and rely fully on the income of their
children. The human capital investment decision now becomes sequential. There will still be
an optimal overall  for the parents, which depends on the degree of uncertainty about future
income, here isolated in the urban sector. The sequentiality will generate predictions of how
the proportion of formally educated siblings from the rst cohort, 1 will a¤ect the proportion
of formally educated siblings from the second cohort, 2 such that the overall optimal  is
achieved. The total number of children N as well as the allocation of children between the two
cohorts, N1 and N2 are all exogenous.
In period 1, parents face uncertainty about period 2 and 3 and maximise the following
expected utility function
max
1;2;s1;s2
EW (c1; c2; c3) = U(C1) + EU(c2) + EU(c3)
11
subject to the budget constraints for the three periods
c1 = Y1   (1  1)N1ea   1N1eb   s1
c2 = Y2 +N
 2
1 [(1  1)N1ya12 + 1N1yb12]  (1  2)N2ea   2N2eb + s1   s2
c3 = N
 3 [((1  1)N1 + (1  2)N2)ya3 + 1N1yb13 + 2N2Eyb23] + s2
N1 is the size of the rst and older cohort of siblings, 1 is the proportion of these that are
educated formally. Their second period urban income is yb12; which has a mean preserving
spread of "12; and their third period urban income is yb13 with a mean preserving spread of
"13: N2 is the size of the second and younger cohort of siblings. 2 is the proportion of these
that are educated formally, and their third period urban income is yb23 with a mean preserving
spread of "23: The total number of children is N = N1 + N2: The assumptions from the two
period model are maintained. I do, however, allow for di¤erent degrees of income transfers in
period 2 and period 3, such that 2 < 3: This is to mimic the fact that only in old-age are
parents dependend on their children for subsistence, as well as the fact that older siblings in
period 2 will primarily be of an age where they are about to establish their own households
and therefore may not contribute as much to the parental household as in the future.
The key point of interest, in terms of empirical implications, is the relationship between 2
on 1: This relation is immediate if the system is solved backwards in time, that is solving the
maximisation problem in period 2, taking the outcome of period 1 as given. The maximisation
problem therefore simplies to the following
max
2;s2
EW (c2; c3) = U(c2) + EU(c3)
subject to
c2 = Y2 +N
 2
1 [(1  1)N1ya2 + 1N1yb12]  (1  2)N2ea   2N2eb + s1   s2
c3 = N
 3 [((1  1)N1 + (1  2)N2)ya3 + 1N1yb13 + 2N2yb23] + s2
which, under the assumption of no liquidity constraints, yields two rst order conditions for 2
and s2, respectively.
N2(e
b   ea)U 0(c2) = E
h
N 3N2(yb23   ya3)U 0(c3)
i
U 0(c2) = EU 0(c3)
It is possible to nd the derivative of 2 with respect to 1 without specifying the preference
or uncertainty structure by di¤erentiating the system above and using Cramers rule. Although
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not perfectly unambiguous analytically, it turns out that under no liquidity constraints and
no child labour and with enough uncertainty, the derivate d2=d1 is negative. Whereas if
liquidity constraints are imposed, child labour is introduced and uncertainty is virtually nil,
then the derivative d2=d1 is positive. See appendix A1 for the exact specication.
2.4 Calibrations and Simulations
Before turning to the empirical analysis, the qualitative results in terms of the d2=d1 deriv-
ative are veried numerically. The second period maximisation problem of the three period
model is therefore calibrated under a set of di¤erent uncertainty structures in the three urban
income measures yb12; y
b
13 and y
b
23: Uncertainty is still modelled as a mean preserving spread for
the urban sector and normalised to zero in the agricultural sector. However, now the uncer-
tainty measures, ("12; "13 and "23) can be perfectly correlated or uncorrelated within cohort,
between cohorts and over time. This gives rise to a variety of di¤erent combinations of uncer-
tainty structures. In the following graphs, I have assumed that uncertainty is uncorrelated over
time ("12 6= "13), but perfectly correlated within and between sibling cohorts ("23 = "13). This
is entirely for illustrative purposes. Calibrations are done for all the possible combinations of
uncertainty structures and the overall qualitative results are the same.
Due to the perfect correlation within cohorts, period 2 can either be in a high income
state (y12 =  + "12) or in a low income state (y12 =    "12), depending on the urban
labour market outcomes for the 1N1 children in the urban sector. The model is calibrated
for N1 = 3; N2 = 3; 2 = 1:5; 3 = 0:95 and y2 = 0:5, the remaining values are identical
to the calibration of the two period model above. Parental second period income has been
reduced to ensure that the sum of parental income and the income transfers from the oldest
cohort are in the neighbourhood of 1, the normalised agricultural income. E.g. if all N1
are traditionally educated and earn ya2 = 1; the total income of the household in the second
period is 0:5 + 3=31:5 = 1:0774: Argueably, this is a bit arbitrary, but the qualitive results are
robust to di¤erent specications. What is important is to have some degree of binding liquidity
constraints under no credit markets.
In gure 3 the negative relationship between schooling of the older and younger cohort is
very clear. The left panel shows the relationship when the second period urban outcome for
cohort one is high, the right panel when the second period urban outcome is low. It is clear,
that there is only a negative relationshipbetween 1 and 2 if there is enough uncertainty. For
uncertainty levels below the normalised agricultural income (" < 1) households will always be
educating all children in the younger cohort irrespective of the older cohort. The need for risk
diversication is not strong enough to generate any sibling dependence. Each line represents
a di¤erent degree of uncertainty (") and thus di¤erent optimal overall  from the two period
problem. Heterogeneity across households, in terms of the uncertainty level they are facing, will
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generate a variety of di¤erent optimal s and thus di¤erent optimal (1; 2) combinations.
(Figure 3)
Take the purple line (" = 1) in the right panel above as an example. Here the optimal
overall  = 12 ; or 3 out of 6 children are being sent to school: When 1 = 1 all three older
siblings are sent to school and therefore none of the younger ones are in school, and vice versa.
If uncertainty increases (" 2 [1:25; 1:75]), this depresses the overall optimal  to 1=6th and
only one out of the total of six children are sent to school such that either 1 = 1=3 or 2 = 1=3
(blue dotted line). The negative relationship between 1 and 2 is thus purely mechanical in
the sense that it is fully determined by the overall optimal  and it only exists for  > 0 and
 < 1: When  = 0; 1 = 2 = 0 and when  = 1; 1 = 2 = 1:
The possible heterogeneity in  results in a cross sectional relationship between 1 and
2 which is not strictly negative. This can be shown by simulating a distribution for  and
1 and from these generate 2: Overall it must hold that  = (1N1 + 2N2)=N such that
2 = (
N   1N1)=N2: From this, the mechanical negative relationship between 1 and 2 is
obvious. The simulations are very simple and do not incorporate the model as such. The main
point is simply to show the negative relationship between 1 and 2 as a consequence of  < 1
due to a need for risk diversication. To ensure a discrete nature in the overall optimal ;
it is generated as nb=N , where nb is the optimal number of children with schooling out of the
total number of N children. N is drawn from a Poisson distribution with E(N) = 5:6 as in the
data. nb is drawn from a binomial distribution given N and with probability E() = 0:715 as
in the data, see table 1 in section 3. From the simulation results in gure 4, it can be seen that
if the distribution of  covers the full range between 0 and 1, then a least squares estimation
of the cross sectional relationship between 1 and 2 results in an inverse U relationship.
(Figure 4)
The correpsonding graph based on the actual data for 1 and 2 without any restrictions
on  is given below in gure 5. Eyeballing the two gures, they seem very close. A joint test
of equality of regression coe¢ cients for the two 1 terms in the least squares regression cannot
be rejected.
(Figure 5)
Comparing gure 4 and gure 5, it shows that the simulated conditional mean function
from a very simple version of the model (where the only role of uncertainty is to make  < 1)
gives exactly the relationship seen in the data.
The obvious question is then, what else (other than uncertainty and the need for risk diver-
sication) could result in an optimal overall  < 1; which would generate the same relationship
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between 1 and 2: Liquidity constraints and child labour cannot, I will return to this shortly.
Another possibilty is that heterogenity in  is driven by heterogeneity in ability (in terms of
schooling) across or within households. If there is heterogenity in ability across households but
not within households, such that each household sample from an ability distribution and all
children within households are identical, then the overall  for each household will always be
at a corner. There will thus be a bangbang solution in the sense that for the low ability house-
hold  = 0 (for these returns to traditional eduaction will be higher than the returns to formal
education); and for high ability households  = 1 (for these schooling is the most protable
educational choice): This is a consequence of no uncertainty and no liquidity constraints.
On the other hand, if the optimal overall  < 1 due to heterogeneity within households,
such that schooling is only a protable investment for some children, then this will yield the
same predictions in gure 4 as uncertainty. Thus, I cannot distinguish the e¤ect on  of within
household ability di¤erences from uncertainty and the need for risk diversication. However,
it must be said that for within household ability di¤erences to be generating the same results,
the dispersion in ability within households must be large enough to locate some siblings below
the cut o¤ point where schooling is no longer the most protable educational choice, and other
siblings above.
Although liquidity constraints can result in less than full enrolment among siblings within
a household, they can never actually general an optimal  < 1: For liquidity constained
households, the optimal  always equals unity as long as schooling is the most protable
educational choice, but the household is forced into a second best solution because it is not
able to optimize intertemporarily. For such households, the choice of 1 will a¤ect the choice
of 2: Even if the household was not able to achieve 1 = 1 due to liquidity constraints,
higher 1 will result in higher second period income and, all else equal, this will ameliorate the
liquidity constraint when it comes to educating the younger cohort. That is, there will be a
positive relationship between 1 and 2: The simulations in gure 4 are based on an underlying
relationship between 1 and 2 as illustrated in gure 3, however when introducing liquidity
constraints and child labour the relationship between 1 and 2 is completely di¤erent, see
gure 6.
(Figure 6)
In gure 6 it is clear that when there is no uncertainty (" = 0); but child labour and liquidity
constraints (ea =  0:025; s = 0), the relationship between 1 and 2 is positive under high
second period outcome for 1N1 urban migrants and zero under low second period outcome.
The positive e¤ect under high second period outcome shows exactly the proposed e¤ect of the
second period income of the older cohort ameliorating the liquidity constraint in the human
capital investment decision for the younger cohort.
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Any negative relationship between 1 and 2 in the data will thus be due human capital
diversication, either as a consequence of uncertainty and the need for risk diversication
or simply due to within household ability di¤erences. It can not be generated by liquidity
constraints and child labour. There are two other, equally important, implications of the
human capital portfolio model. If  < 1 due to risk diversication of future income sources,
then the negative sibling dependence should in principle only hold for rural households, because
urban households do not have the agricultural income diversication possibility. Second, the
portfolio e¤ect should also only hold for sons and not for daughters, because Tanzania is
largely a patrilineal society where the obligations of daughters vis-a-vis their family shift to
their husbands family upon marriage. Daughters can therefore not be relied upon for old-
age security and, thus, there is no need for ensuring risk diversication of their future income
sources. Within household ability di¤erences can not generate such predictions. There are no
reasons to believe that within household ability heterogenity is gender specic, nor that only
rural households should face within household ability di¤erences, but urban households should
not. Testing for di¤erences across gender and across sector is therefore an implicit test of the
uncertainty explanation versus the within household ability explanation.
3 Data
In order to test the empirical implications of the portfolio model above, I use a large-scale
nationwide cross-sectional household survey from Tanzania undertaken in 1994, the Human
Resource and Development Survey (HRDS).11 It is a nationally representative survey of 5,000
households out of which more than half of the households have school-aged children. The
HRDS data contains detailed information on individual household members, including their
educational status. At household level, there is information about sources of income, detailed
assets and expenditure information and, not least, schooling expenditures, school distance
as well as the heads assesment of the quality of the local primary school. Out of the 5000
households, only households where the household head has children (or step-children) of school
age as well as children beyond school age are included. Combined with a need for non-missing
observations of the included variables, this reduces the sample to 1328 households, out of
which slightly more than half are urban. Although the portfolio model is only applicable to
rural households with access to both formal and traditional education, urban households are
included for that exact comparison. Table 1 lists summary statistics for all relevant variables
from the data set.
11The survey was a joint e¤ort undertaken by the Department of Economics of the University of Dar es Salaam,
the Government of Tanzania, and the World Bank, and was funded by the World Bank, the Government
of Japan, and the British Overseas Development Agency. For more information or access to the data see
www.worldbank.org/lsms
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[Table 1]
There are three groups of variables, which are included in the emprirical analysis. First of
all, the sibling composition and allocation between formal education and traditional education.
N1 children are all children beyond school age, N2 children are of school age that is between
7-17 years old. 1 and 2 refer to the proportion of children which are through or in formal
schooling, respectively. The variables are also split by gender, allowing to test the hypothesised
sibling dependence separately for sons and daughters. There is an average of 5-6 children in
total, the number is slightly higher in rural than in urban areas. There is an overall schooling
rate of children of slightly more than 70% for this sample of households.
The second group of variables characterise the household. These variable include proxies for
model variables. Parental income is proxied by household expenditure. There are no income
measures in the data set, and commonly expenditure measures are thought to be better proxies
for life time income and less prone to measurement error than income measures, especially when
looking at rural households with a family-based agricultural production system, Deaton (1998).
More than 90 per cent of rural households have agriculture as their main source of income,
whereas this number is almost 35 per cent for urban households, indicating that the rural urban
divide in terms of agriculture and non-agriculture is not perfect, but still useful. Schooling is
almost three times more expensive in urban areas, compared to rural areas, where the annual
school costs amount to roughly 6 USD and rural school children have an average of 1.5 km
to cover to go to school. 40 per cent of rural households have at least 2 heads of livestock
or 5 pigs or sheep. Each rural household has an average of almost 15 hectars of land, but
there is a lot of dispersion in this number. The median rural household has 10 hectars and
only the top quartile of the distribution have land holdings above 18 hectars. There is a fairly
even distribution of muslims, catholic and protestants in rural areas, whereas muslims are a
dominating group in urban areas. There are more than 100 di¤erent tribes in Tanzania, in the
empirical analysis below I control for tribal a¢ liation of the largest ten tribes at village level.
Although income sources are clearly predominantly agricultural in rural areas, there are still
roughly 20 per cent of households with wage or self-employment business income. This number
is naturally considerably higher in urban area.
The last group of variables are indicator variables for whether the household head considers
the local primary school to have an adequate or good quality of the variable in question. In
general, school quality does not seem to be rated too poorly, except for school supplies.
4 Empirical Specication and Results
The proportion of children enrolled in school is the choice variable in the second period of
the three period model above and thus also the dependent variable in the empirical analysis
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below. It can be expressed either as the number of children attending school, nb2, out of the
total number of school-aged children, N2, or as the proportion, 2 = nb2=N2: This gives rise
to two alternative empirical model specications, either a double censored Tobit model or a
binomial count model. The doubled-censored Tobit model can estimate the proportion of N2
children in school, 2 taking into account that 2 is censored at 0 and at 1. However, 2 will
be of a discrete character since there is a natural upper bound to the total number of young
o¤spring in a household. The underlying assumption of continuity in the dependent variable
of the Tobit model might therefore be inappropriate.
The alternative is to model the choice of nb2 directly as a count variable. It is then important
to use a count model, which takes the upper censoring into account, such that predicted values of
nb2 never exceeds N2. This is the key feature of the standard binomial count model, Winkelman
(1997). This model estimates the number of children attending primary school nb2, conditional
on the total number of school-aged children in the household N2.12 When conditioning on N2;
it is clearly treated as exogenous to the schooling decision and all results should be interpreted
given the number of school aged children. Although the main empirical analysis is based on
the binomial count model, results are also reported for the Tobit model as well as the linear
probability model in section 4.2 to check whether results are robust to model specication.
4.1 Econometric Model
The number of children in school nb2 is assumed to be binomially distributed and can therefore
be thought of as a sum of independent and homogenous Bernoulli-trials up until N2. That
is, the current household demand for schooling is modelled as a sum of N2 binary individual
choices concerning school attendance, which are assumed to be independent and with the same
school attendance probabilities (2)13.
Pr(schooli = 1) = 2; where i = 1; 2; :::; N2 and 2 2 [0; 1]
and nb is binomially distributed
N2X
i=1
schooli = n
b
2  Bin(N2; 2)
The expected value of nb2 is E(n
b
2) = N22 and the variance is V ar(n
b
2) = N22(1   2).
The e¤ect of di¤erent explanatory variables contained in x will enter through the link function
12This model is not commonly used in the economics litearture, but a related example is by Thomas, Strauss,
and Henriques (1990). They use the binomial model to study child mortality within families, conditional on the
total number of children ever born.
13The assumptions of homogeneity and independence among children within the household will be relaxed
shortly.
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G(x0) of the (conditional) probability of school attendance, 2(x0) = G(x0) =
exp(x0)
1+exp(x0) =
(x0); which here is the logistic distribution. Assume that the conditional mean is correctly
specied as E(nb2jx; N2) = N22(x0) and the conditional probability of the number of children
attending primary school being equal to nb2 is Pr(y = n
b
2jx) =
 nb2
N2

2(x
0)n
b
2(1 2(x0))N2 nb2 .
The log-likelihood function for each household is then given by
lnL() = ln

nb2
N2

+ nb2 ln(x
0) + (N2   nb2) ln(1  (x0))
and the rst order conditions with respect to  is given by
@ lnL
@
= nb2x N2

exp(x0)
1 + exp(x0)

x =

nb2   E(nb2jx; N2

)x = 0
the solution to which is the maximum likelihood estimator ^ML.
However, maximum likelihood estimation requires the underlying binomial distribution to
be correctly specied, that is assuming homogeneity and independence concerning school at-
tendance among the children of a household. If these assumptions do not hold, the model
generates over- or under-dispersion relative to the specied distribution variance of nb2. By
using the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator, that is nding the  that satises the rst or-
der condition rather than the  that maximises the likelihood function above, it is possible to
relax the distributional assumptions concerning the conditional variance and instead allow for
the robust sandwich estimator initially introduced by Huber (1967). The conditional variance
of nb2, which is part of the robust sandwich estimator of var(), is then simply estimated by
\V ar(nb2jx; N2) = (nb2   \E(nb2jx; N2))2, where \E(nb2jx; N2) = N22(x0^): The sandwich estima-
tor is robust to over- and under-dispersion, heteroskedasticity, distributional misspecication
and clustering, as long as the conditional mean is correctly specied, (Cameron and Trivedi
(1998), Newson (1999) and Wooldridge (2002)). Thus, this variance estimator is robust to
violation of the assumptions of homogeneity and independence among the school-aged children
in the household.
4.2 Empirical Results
There are three testable empirical implications of the three period portfolio model. First of
all, an implication of the need for future risk diversication is that, given enough uncertainty
about future income transfers, there will be negative sibling dependence among the younger
and older cohorts of siblings. Second, this should primarily hold for siblings in rural households,
because urban households do not have the same diversication possibilities between formal and
traditional education. Third, it should also only hold for sons and not for daughters due to
the patrilineal structure of the Tanzanian society. The model is therefore in principle only
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applicable to rural sons.
(Table 2)
Column 1 in table 2 is a binomial regression of the number of primary school attending sons
from cohort 2 out of the total number of sons in cohort 2, N2. It is regressed on 1; N1 of older
brothers and N2 as well as on proxies for the remaining model variables. Household income is
proxied by the expenditure measure and a control for whether agriculture is the main source
of income as well as an interaction term taking the parental agricultural earning abilities into
account. Costs of schooling eb are proxied by the average school cost in the village as well as
the average distance to the local primary school in the village. Finally, an indicator variable for
whether the household has a herd or not is included, this is thought as a proxy for ea. The key
variable of interest is the e¤ect of 1 on 2 (which in e¤ect is the dependent variable) among
rural sons.
When 1 enter as a linear term in the 2 regression, it has no signicant e¤ect on 2.
However, if the e¤ect of 1 is allowed to be non-linear and a quadratic term is included, it
is soon clear that the insignicance of the linear term is due to the underlying non-linearity.
There is both a strong positive e¤ect of 1 on 2 for lower levels of 1 and a strong negative
e¤ect for higher levels of 1: The turning point is constant across the three specictions for
rural sons in column 2-4, which allow for di¤erent sets of control vairables. In column 2 only
the model proxies are included, column 3 also includes school quality controls and column 4 in
addtion includes a number of household characteristics as well as tribal controls and religious
a¢ liation. Somewhat surprisingly, apart from the quadratic 1 terms, only the latter group is
(jointly) signicant. A series of other control variables have all been tested insignicant and
without any inuence of the 1 estimated coe¢ cients.
The turning point of the inverse U equals 0.57 for all three specications in column 2-4.
Below this point, the positive relationship between 1 and 2 is either due to the ameliorating
e¤ect of N2 children on the liquidity constraints or simply a consequence of cross-sectional
heterogenity in , as illustrated in gure 4 and 5. It is impossible to separate which of these
two positive e¤ects are dominating. However, this is not true when it comes to the negative
e¤ect of 1 on 2 for higher levels of 1. The model predicts that when there is no uncertainty
about future income transfers, there will always be a positive e¤ect of 1 on 2 due to the
positive income e¤ect. Only a considerable degree of uncertainty and thus a strong enough
need to diversify risk by diversifying income sources can generate a negative e¤ect of high levels
of 1 on 2. That such a negative e¤ect exists for rural sons cannot be rejected. It even exists
for a substantial part of the N1 distribution, only 30.46% of the rural households with sons
have 1  0:57 among sons. Thus, for a majority of younger sons, the parental need for future
risk diversication seems to be a main determinant for their schooling decision.
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The picture is di¤erent for rural daughters. The schooling rate of younger daughters (2)
is estimated in column 5. There is no signicant e¤ect of schooling of their older sisters,
irrespective of the functional form. Column 4 reports the quadratic e¤ect, but a pure linear
e¤ect is also insignicant, although in some specications a positive e¤ect of the linear term
is signicant at 10%. The 1 terms for rural daughters cannot be tested jointly signicantly
di¤erent from zero, they can also not be tested jointly signicantly di¤erent from the two 1
coe¢ cients of the rural sons. There is too much imprecision to say anything conclusive about
whether there is positive or negative sibling dependence among sisters. The schooling decision
of girls do, however, seem to respond to income e¤ects. There is a positive signicant (at 10%)
e¤ect of log of household expenditure on schooling of the younger cohort of sisters with a high
marginal e¤ect of 32% for the average rural household with daughters. The distance to the local
primary school also matters signicantly. Calculating the marginal e¤ect, an extra kilometer
in terms of distance can reduce the proportion of younger sisters in school by 8 percentage
points. Overall, it seems safe to conclude that for daughters it is unlikely to be portfolio e¤ects
among sisters, which dominate the schooling decisions made by parents, but there could be
some degree of sister rivalry. This gender di¤erence between sons and daughters is consistent
with the risk diversifcation hypothesis, but not with the possible alternative of  < 1 due to
within household ability di¤erences.
There is a lot of imprecision in the estimates for both sons and daughters when the sample
is split by gender. This is not surprising. First of all, only households, which have children
of the same gender in both the younger and older cohort, are included. Second, there is less
variation in the dependent variable because there are fewer N2 sons or N2 daughters, this will
generate more corner solutions. Furthermore, there might be size e¤ects from splitting the
sample. More corner solutions can in itself generate stronger negative e¤ects of 1: However, if
results were purely driven by size e¤ects, they should be stronger for daughters than for sons
because the sample for daughters is smaller than that for sons. This is not the case.
Households are aggregated to include all siblings of rural households in column 6 and,
for comparison, of urban households in column 7. Finally, the model is also estimated on
the full sample in column 8, which naturally increases the level of precision in the coe¢ cient
estimates. Now household expenditure has a strong signicantly positive e¤ect, and there is a
negative e¤ect of high levels of agricultural income, consistent with traditional education being
a relatively more attractive educational alternative. But what is more important, is that the
non-linear quadratic e¤ects of 1 on 2 are also strongly signicant on the full sample. In fact,
they seem stronger for the full sample than for the rural sample, indicating that the size e¤ects
are likely to be negligible. The turning point of the inverse U of 2 is now higher and very
close to the actual rate of schooling in the data,  = 0:7: When looking at colum 6 and 7,
however, it is clear that the quadratic e¤ect stems from the rural households. Among urban
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households there is a positive linear e¤ect of 1 on 2; but the quadratic terms is insignicant.
A joint test for whether the two 1 terms for urban households in column 7 equals those of
the rural households in column 6 is rejected at a 5% level, indicating that there is very limited
scope for human capital diversication among siblings in urban households. Thus, the model
implications of risk and income source diversication generating negative sibling dependence
among older and younger siblings in rural households and, within these, primarily among sons,
cannot be rejected by the data.
(Table 3)
The results are robust over a range of empirical specications with the inclusion or exclusion
of a number of di¤erent control variables, such as whether households have electricity, bank
accounts, access to transport, and ownership of own house. From table 3 it also shows that,
in addition, results are robust to choice of econometric model. The qualitative ndings are
the same both for the full sample of households, as well as when the sample is split by rural
or urban households. The turning point for the inverse U of 1 is also reasonable stable over
the di¤erent specications. It is 0.75 and 0.77 for the full sample in the Tobit model and the
linear probability model, respectively, and 0.63 and 0.65 for the rural households in the same
two models. This has to be compared with 0.7 and 0.63 for the full sample and the rural
households, respectively, in the binomial model.
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The main contribution of this paper is to extend a simple two-period human capital portfolio
model, which allows for two types of education with di¤erent returns and di¤erent risk, such
that it can generate empirical predictions directly testable in standard household data from
developing countries. By extending the model to a three-period model and allowing for se-
quentiality in the human capital investment decision of siblings, it is possible to derive testable
model predictions of sibling dependence due to risk diversication, which di¤er from predictions
based on sibling rivalry over scarce resources.
The key implication of the two-period model is that uncertainty about future income trans-
fers from children generates a need for future risk and thus income source diversication, which
spills over into a need for current human capital diversication in the educational choice of chil-
dren. This human capital diversication is only possible in rural areas, where there exists a
clear dichotomy between formal and traditional education and the associated future urban and
agricultural employment. Traditional education in terms of on-farm learning by doing endows
children with specic skills or human capital directing them towards future agricultural work
or farming. Formal education, on the other hand, endows children with general human capital
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suitable for future modern or urban employment. As long as returns and risks of the agricul-
tural and the urban sector are uncorrelated, an obvious ex-ante risk management strategy of
income smoothing is simply to ensure an optimal balancing of risk and returns from these two
sectors by diversifying the human capital portfolio of children already when they are of school
age.
Model implications makes it possible to disentangle sibling dependency due to risk diversi-
cation from the standard argument of sibling rivalry over scarce resources in the child labour
literature. The testable empirical prediction is that there should be a negative relationship
between schooling of the younger and older sibling cohorts. The empirical analysis shows that
such a negative sibling dependence does indeed exist when the proportion of formally educated
older siblings is high, consistent with a need ofr risk diversication due to uncertainty about
future returns to education. The result holds for the full sample of households, and when look-
ing into the specic subsamples, it holds for rural households and not for urban, and it is only
strong and signicant for the specic subsample of rural sons, exactly as expected considering
the human capital portfolio model.
The question is then whether such a negative e¤ect for the specic subsample of rural
sons could be caused by something else. First, it cannot be explained by liquidity constraints,
because these older siblings beyond school age typically contribute to household income. Sec-
ond, birth order e¤ets, which are often used as a prime indicator for whether or not a child
is attending school in empirical analyses based on individual children, would also predict the
opposite e¤ect. It is generally thought that the older siblings work to help pay for schooling
of the younger ones, the e¤ect should therefore be positive. Third, the negative e¤ect of a
high proportion of schooling of older siblings on the proportion of schooling of the younger
ones is also not likely to be caused by transitory income shocks. Transitory income shocks in
rural areas are generally caused by failing agricultural income (e.g. due to adverse weather
conditions), households with older formally educated siblings and thus access to urban income
sources should be able to shield the schooling of the younger siblings better than households
without, which would generate a positive rather than a negative relationship. Finally, within
household ability di¤erences could be generating the same overall results. Within household
ability di¤erences would also result in an over  < 1 with a mechanical negative relationship
between 1 and 2 as found in the simulations. However, within household ability di¤erences
cannot explain the empirical ndings in terms of gender di¤erences and rural-urban di¤erences.
The nal conclusion is therefore that future income uncertainty and the need for risk di-
versication does a¤ect the joint schooling decision to such an extent that there is negative
sibling dependence between cohorts. The return side of the human capital investment decision
can thus be a dominating factor in the human capital investment decision made by parents on
behalf of their children. I do not wish to question the importance of liquidity constraints on the
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schooling decision of children, in fact I also nd some evidence of income e¤ects, however what
I do question is whether the liquidity constraint explanation, which only relates to the cost
side of the human capital investment decision is indeed the full explanation. Taking the return
side into consideration when analysing the human capital investment decisions of parents has
important implications for educational policies. If the objective of policy makers is to ensure
full enrolment into primary schools, lowering the costs of schooling will have a positive, but
insu¢ cient e¤ect for the objective to be reached in rural areas where traditional agricultural
production systems require specic skills, passed on by generations. Only in modern more
complex agricultural production systems, where there are learning opportunitiesfrom general
human capital skills, as Rosenzweig (1995) puts it, will formal schooling generate a return.
When the production technology is simple, there are generally very limited or no returns to
formal schooling, e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig (1996), Fafchamps and Quisumbing (1999) and
Jolli¤e (2004). Parents, I am sure, perceive this.
So, is it possible to generate returns to formal schooling in simple agriculture? What if
primary schooling did not only endow children with general human capital in terms of math-
ematics and reading and writing Kiswahili and English (as it is the case in Tanzania, where
a third, tribal, language is the mother tongue of most children), but also endowed children
in rural areas with some of the specic skills needed for a future life in farming? That is,
adapting the curricula of primary education to the future needs and necessary life skills of the
children supposed to attend school. As a matter of fact, the parents of the HRDS data give the
answer themselves. In the survey, they have been asked a number of questions about education
and school curricula, including a question on what they think are the important subjects that
should be taught in primary schools14. They were asked to rank ve subjects according to
importance: (i) teaching good written and spoken Kiswahili, (ii) teaching good written and
spoken English, (iii) religious or moral education that teaches children to be polite, respectful
and good citizens, (iv) teaching technical skills for agriulture and business(which is the only
course out of the ve that is not actually being taught), and (v) teaching mathematics and
science. There is no doubt about their answer, teaching technical skills for agriculture and
business rank highest. Parents want, not only general, but also specic skills for their children.
They want skills diversication.
14Section 2, part B, question 80-85 in the HRDS questionnaire.
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6 Figures
Figure 1. E¤ect of uncertainty " on optimal overall proportion of siblings in school 
- under no liquidity constraints and no child labour (ea = 0:0125)
Figure 2. E¤ect of uncertainty " on optimal overall proportion of siblings in school 
- under liquidity constraints and child labour (ea =  0:025)
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Figure 3. E¤ect of older cohorts 1 on younger cohorts 2
- under no liquidity constraints and no child labour (s 7 0; ea = 0:0125)
- under no correlation over time and perfect correlation within cohorts and between cohorts
Figure 4. Estimation of 1 and 2 relationship on simulated data for full distribution of 
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Figure 5. Estimation of 1 and 2 relationship on actual data for full distribution of 
Figure 6. E¤ect of older cohorts 1 on younger cohorts 2
- under liquidity constraints and child labour (s  0; ea =  0:025)
- under no correlation over time and perfect correlation within and between cohorts
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7 Tables
Table 1. Summary statistics
Rural HHs Urban HHs
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Sibling composition
pi 0.715 0.260 0.000 1.000 0.787 0.274 0.000 1.000
pi1 0.721 0.329 0.000 1.000 0.780 0.347 0.000 1.000
pi1 (sons) 0.710 0.393 0.000 1.000 0.755 0.397 0.000 1.000
pi1 (daughters) 0.721 0.393 0.000 1.000 0.812 0.358 0.000 1.000
pi2 0.741 0.386 0.000 1.000 0.799 0.354 0.000 1.000
pi2 (sons) 0.739 0.398 0.000 1.000 0.808 0.368 0.000 1.000
pi2 (daughters) 0.746 0.411 0.000 1.000 0.808 0.370 0.000 1.000
N2 children in school 1.633 1.067 0.000 6.000 1.635 1.067 0.000 6.000
N2 sons in school 0.833 0.801 0.000 4.000 0.820 0.822 0.000 4.000
N2 daughters in school 0.800 0.856 0.000 4.000 0.815 0.821 0.000 4.000
N1 2.306 1.248 1.000 10.000 2.108 1.059 1.000 6.000
N1 sons 1.187 0.942 0.000 5.000 1.092 0.881 0.000 4.000
N1 daughters 1.119 1.000 0.000 6.000 1.016 0.893 0.000 4.000
N2 2.063 1.297 1.000 9.000 2.288 1.386 1.000 9.000
N2 sons 1.179 1.060 0.000 8.000 1.181 1.029 0.000 6.000
N2 daughters 0.884 0.919 0.000 5.000 1.107 1.033 0.000 6.000
Proportion of daughters 0.461 0.236 0.000 1.000 0.484 0.232 0.000 1.000
N 5.606 2.342 2.000 19.000 5.289 1.921 2.000 15.000
Household characteristics
HH expenditure per AE per day 0.708 0.501 0.125 5.213 1.260 1.218 0.130 14.008
Agriculture is main income 0.904 0.295 0.000 1.000 0.344 0.475 0.000 1.000
Av. school costs in village 6.369 3.567 1.718 19.281 19.129 13.190 1.622 82.135
Av school distance (km) 1.542 1.033 0.185 5.417 1.317 0.627 0.111 3.625
HH has livestock 0.413 0.493 0.000 1.000 0.082 0.274 0.000 1.000
Land(ha) 14.682 14.696 0.000 125.000 6.058 14.759 0.000 250.000
HH size 8.508 3.219 3.000 32.000 8.093 2.780 3.000 25.000
HH head female 0.099 0.299 0.000 1.000 0.145 0.353 0.000 1.000
Muslim HH 0.277 0.448 0.000 1.000 0.567 0.496 0.000 1.000
Catholic HH 0.346 0.476 0.000 1.000 0.218 0.413 0.000 1.000
Protestant HH 0.265 0.441 0.000 1.000 0.148 0.356 0.000 1.000
Village prop. of HHs w wage income 0.164 0.118 0.000 0.565 0.571 0.218 0.053 1.222
Village prop. of HHs w business income 0.046 0.056 0.000 0.273 0.122 0.081 0.000 0.500
School quality assesment
Teachers good/adequate 0.746 0.436 0.000 1.000 0.881 0.324 0.000 1.000
Headmaster good/adequate 0.823 0.382 0.000 1.000 0.917 0.276 0.000 1.000
School supplies good/adequate 0.411 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.454 0.498 0.000 1.000
Environment good/adequate 0.552 0.498 0.000 1.000 0.656 0.475 0.000 1.000
Self-reliance good/adequate 0.798 0.402 0.000 1.000 0.828 0.378 0.000 1.000
Swahili lessons good/adequate 0.869 0.338 0.000 1.000 0.932 0.252 0.000 1.000
English lessons good/adequate 0.593 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.731 0.444 0.000 1.000
Math lessons good/adequate 0.777 0.417 0.000 1.000 0.855 0.353 0.000 1.000
Moral lessons good/adequate 0.728 0.445 0.000 1.000 0.818 0.387 0.000 1.000
Max number of observations 654 674
30
T
ab
le
2.
R
ob
us
t
bi
no
m
ia
l
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
n
b 2
gi
ve
n
N
2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
R
u
ra
l
R
u
ra
l
R
u
ra
l
R
u
ra
l
R
u
ra
l
R
u
ra
l
U
rb
an
A
ll
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
:
n
b
2
o
u
t
o
f
N
2
S
o
n
s
S
o
n
s
S
o
n
s
S
o
n
s
D
au
g
h
te
rs
H
H
s
H
H
s
H
H
s
p
i1
0.
25
1
3.
70
6*
**
3.
63
0*
**
3.
76
0*
**
3.
28
4
1.
86
7*
*
2.
21
1*
*
2.
13
4*
**
(0
.2
48
)
(1
.3
78
)
(1
.3
73
)
(1
.4
05
)
(2
.6
22
)
(0
.8
16
)
(1
.0
17
)
(0
.6
13
)
p
i1
sq
u
ar
ed
-3
.2
82
**
-3
.1
85
**
-3
.3
30
**
-2
.7
29
-1
.4
76
*
-1
.3
14
-1
.5
14
**
*
(1
.2
75
)
(1
.2
75
)
(1
.3
00
)
(2
.5
80
)
(0
.7
72
)
(0
.9
16
)
(0
.5
66
)
N
2
-0
.1
00
-0
.1
28
-0
.1
18
-0
.1
89
-0
.1
33
-0
.0
34
-0
.0
41
-0
.0
32
(0
.0
97
)
(0
.0
92
)
(0
.0
90
)
(0
.1
26
)
(0
.1
62
)
(0
.0
62
)
(0
.0
85
)
(0
.0
50
)
N
1
0.
11
2
0.
02
1
0.
05
4
0.
02
8
0.
39
3
0.
19
5*
**
-0
.0
64
0.
08
0*
(0
.1
09
)
(0
.0
96
)
(0
.0
93
)
(0
.1
19
)
(0
.2
83
)
(0
.0
65
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
47
)
P
ro
p
or
ti
on
of
d
au
gh
te
rs
0.
40
8
0.
42
6
0.
48
0
0.
28
7
0.
14
0
0.
06
6
0.
15
4
0.
07
7
(0
.4
97
)
(0
.4
67
)
(0
.4
62
)
(0
.6
45
)
(0
.7
99
)
(0
.2
68
)
(0
.3
16
)
(0
.2
02
)
ln
(H
H
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
p
er
A
E
p
er
d
ay
,
U
S
D
)
-0
.6
94
-0
.6
49
-0
.6
07
-0
.6
71
1.
03
8*
0.
42
3*
*
0.
49
8*
**
0.
47
5*
**
(0
.8
09
)
(0
.7
52
)
(0
.7
13
)
(0
.7
12
)
(0
.5
72
)
(0
.1
99
)
(0
.1
93
)
(0
.1
52
)
ln
(H
H
ex
p
)*
A
gr
i.
m
ai
n
in
co
m
e
0.
89
6
0.
86
3
0.
86
7
0.
86
3
-0
.6
88
-0
.2
31
-0
.4
29
*
-0
.3
05
*
(0
.8
35
)
(0
.7
78
)
(0
.7
42
)
(0
.7
25
)
(0
.6
07
)
(0
.2
27
)
(0
.2
48
)
(0
.1
74
)
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
is
m
ai
n
in
co
m
e
0.
28
6
0.
36
6
0.
43
5
0.
51
4
-0
.7
17
-0
.2
36
0.
00
3
-0
.0
21
(0
.5
77
)
(0
.5
56
)
(0
.5
30
)
(0
.5
36
)
(0
.5
89
)
(0
.2
15
)
(0
.1
73
)
(0
.1
28
)
A
v.
an
nu
al
sc
h
oo
l
co
st
s
in
vi
ll
ag
e,
U
S
D
0.
02
5
0.
02
1
0.
00
9
-0
.0
12
0.
03
1
0.
01
7
0.
00
6
0.
00
3
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
07
)
A
v
sc
h
oo
l
d
is
ta
n
ce
(k
m
)
-0
.0
82
-0
.0
66
-0
.0
77
-0
.0
87
-0
.2
64
**
-0
.0
83
-0
.3
79
**
*
-0
.1
41
**
*
(0
.0
81
)
(0
.0
87
)
(0
.0
93
)
(0
.0
95
)
(0
.1
27
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.1
21
)
(0
.0
54
)
H
H
h
as
li
ve
st
oc
k
-0
.2
41
-0
.3
01
-0
.3
02
-0
.3
11
0.
09
7
-0
.2
14
-0
.2
35
-0
.1
58
(0
.1
87
)
(0
.1
83
)
(0
.1
98
)
(0
.2
11
)
(0
.2
88
)
(0
.1
35
)
(0
.3
05
)
(0
.1
26
)
L
an
d
(h
a)
-0
.0
02
0.
01
3
0.
00
2
0.
01
7
0.
00
5
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
04
)
H
H
si
ze
0.
02
0
-0
.0
29
-0
.0
28
0.
02
3
-0
.0
13
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
47
)
(0
.0
21
)
H
H
h
ea
d
fe
m
al
e
-0
.3
56
0.
26
1
-0
.2
22
0.
31
8
0.
04
8
(0
.4
00
)
(0
.4
38
)
(0
.1
87
)
(0
.2
97
)
(0
.1
67
)
V
il
la
ge
p
ro
p
.
of
H
H
s
w
w
ag
e
in
co
m
e
0.
44
0
-1
.1
84
-0
.0
77
1.
66
5*
**
0.
53
5*
*
(0
.8
54
)
(1
.0
92
)
(0
.5
16
)
(0
.4
56
)
(0
.2
67
)
V
il
la
ge
p
ro
p
.
of
H
H
s
w
b
u
si
n
es
s
in
co
m
e
-0
.1
89
10
.2
28
**
*
3.
15
8*
*
2.
78
6*
*
2.
32
2*
**
(2
.1
94
)
(2
.2
54
)
(1
.4
06
)
(1
.2
63
)
(0
.8
05
)
C
on
st
an
t
0.
53
4
0.
46
2
0.
30
4
0.
55
3
0.
59
6
0.
63
8
-1
.0
03
0.
14
5
(0
.6
56
)
(0
.6
19
)
(0
.6
92
)
(0
.7
54
)
(1
.0
29
)
(0
.4
40
)
(0
.6
61
)
(0
.3
37
)
S
ch
oo
l
qu
al
it
y
co
nt
ro
ls
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
**
Y
es
Y
es
**
*
T
ri
b
al
an
d
re
li
gi
ou
s
co
nt
ro
ls
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
**
*
Y
es
**
*
Y
es
**
*
Y
es
**
*
Y
es
**
*
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
36
3
36
3
36
3
36
3
28
1
65
4
67
4
13
28
R
ob
u
st
cl
u
st
er
co
rr
ec
te
d
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
**
*
p
<
0.
01
,
**
p
<
0.
05
,
*
p
<
0.
1
31
T
ab
le
3.
R
ob
us
tn
es
s
ch
ec
k
of
ec
on
om
et
ri
c
m
od
el T
o
b
it
m
o
d
el
L
in
ea
r
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
m
o
d
el
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
:
p
i2
A
ll
H
H
s
R
u
ra
l
H
H
s
U
rb
an
H
H
s
A
ll
H
H
s
R
u
ra
l
H
H
s
U
rb
an
H
H
s
p
i1
1.
17
8*
**
1.
09
2*
**
1.
02
4
0.
40
2*
**
0.
40
6*
**
0.
32
0
(0
.3
96
)
(0
.3
92
)
(0
.8
05
)
(0
.1
33
)
(0
.1
54
)
(0
.2
14
)
p
i1
sq
u
ar
ed
-0
.7
88
**
-0
.8
73
**
-0
.3
14
-0
.2
61
**
-0
.3
14
**
-0
.1
14
(0
.3
59
)
(0
.3
64
)
(0
.7
05
)
(0
.1
17
)
(0
.1
39
)
(0
.1
82
)
N
2
-0
.1
19
**
*
-0
.0
83
**
*
-0
.1
96
**
*
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
11
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
10
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
14
)
N
1
0.
05
2*
0.
12
1*
**
-0
.0
62
0.
01
7*
*
0.
04
5*
**
-0
.0
10
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
35
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
09
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
11
)
P
ro
p
or
ti
on
of
d
au
gh
te
rs
-0
.0
71
-0
.0
79
0.
00
3
-0
.0
18
-0
.0
29
0.
00
9
(0
.1
26
)
(0
.1
37
)
(0
.2
47
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
57
)
(0
.0
58
)
ln
(H
H
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
p
er
A
E
p
er
d
ay
,
U
S
D
)
0.
27
1*
**
0.
35
0*
**
0.
23
8*
0.
07
9*
**
0.
13
0*
**
0.
05
8*
*
(0
.0
88
)
(0
.1
21
)
(0
.1
31
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.0
29
)
ln
(H
H
ex
p
)*
A
gr
i.
m
ai
n
in
co
m
e
-0
.1
45
-0
.2
37
*
-0
.1
29
-0
.0
36
-0
.0
80
-0
.0
34
(0
.0
99
)
(0
.1
34
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
42
)
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
re
is
m
ai
n
in
co
m
e
-0
.0
15
-0
.1
49
0.
00
1
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
50
0.
00
3
(0
.0
82
)
(0
.1
44
)
(0
.1
33
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
30
)
A
v.
an
nu
al
sc
h
oo
l
co
st
s
in
vi
ll
ag
e,
U
S
D
0.
00
1
0.
00
7
0.
00
6
-0
.0
00
0.
00
4
0.
00
0
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
01
)
A
v
sc
h
oo
l
d
is
ta
n
ce
(k
m
)
-0
.1
21
**
*
-0
.0
73
**
-0
.3
29
**
*
-0
.0
39
**
*
-0
.0
32
**
-0
.0
83
**
*
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
88
)
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
23
)
H
H
h
as
li
ve
st
oc
k
-0
.1
12
-0
.1
25
*
-0
.1
94
-0
.0
47
*
-0
.0
62
**
-0
.0
40
(0
.0
73
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.2
02
)
(0
.0
26
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
47
)
L
an
d
(h
a)
0.
00
3
0.
00
1
0.
01
0*
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
H
H
si
ze
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
16
0.
03
7
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
06
0.
00
7
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
07
)
H
H
h
ea
d
fe
m
al
e
0.
00
6
-0
.1
04
0.
13
3
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
42
0.
02
4
(0
.0
98
)
(0
.1
04
)
(0
.2
02
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
46
)
V
il
la
ge
p
ro
p
.
of
H
H
s
w
w
ag
e
in
co
m
e
0.
20
1
-0
.0
26
0.
87
9*
**
0.
05
0
0.
00
4
0.
18
9*
**
(0
.1
58
)
(0
.2
70
)
(0
.3
08
)
(0
.0
48
)
(0
.1
14
)
(0
.0
72
)
V
il
la
ge
p
ro
p
.
of
H
H
s
w
b
u
si
n
es
s
in
co
m
e
1.
21
1*
**
1.
76
1*
**
1.
72
1*
*
0.
33
0*
*
0.
62
9*
**
0.
39
9*
(0
.4
56
)
(0
.5
98
)
(0
.8
59
)
(0
.1
35
)
(0
.2
38
)
(0
.2
06
)
C
on
st
an
t
0.
88
2*
**
1.
06
0*
**
0.
17
1
0.
60
2*
**
0.
69
2*
**
0.
39
3*
**
(0
.2
01
)
(0
.2
54
)
(0
.4
60
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
26
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
13
28
65
4
67
4
13
28
65
4
67
4
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
.
.
.
0.
11
7
0.
12
8
0.
15
9
R
ob
u
st
cl
u
st
er
co
rr
ec
te
d
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
**
*
p
<
0.
01
,
**
p
<
0.
05
,
*
p
<
0.
1
32
8 Appendix A1
Under no liquidity constraints and no child labour, the derivative of 2 with respect to 1is
found by using Cramers rule on the system of rst order conditions. It is given by
d2
d1
=
ED  BF
AD  BC
where
A = D =
h
 (eb   ea)N2U 00(c2)  E

N2N
 3(yb23   ya3)U 00(c3)
i
> 0
B =
 U 00(c2)  EU 00(c3) > 0
C =

 

(eb   ea)N2
2
U 00(c2)  E

N2N
 3(yb23   ya3)
2
U 00(c3)

> 0
E =
h
E

N1N
 3(yb13   ya3)U 00(c3)

 N1 21 (yb12   ya2)U 00(c2)
i
< 0
F =
h
E

N 23N2(yb23   ya3)N1(yb13   ya3)U 00(c3)

  (eb   ea)N1 21 N2(yb12   ya2)U 00(c2)
i
< 0
Although not immediate from above, it turns out that the derivative is generally negative
and in particularly so the larger the uncertainty.
Under liquidity constraints (s = 0) and child labour (ea < 0), the derivative is simply given
by
d2
d1
=
F
C
which is by all means easier to interpret. The sign depends on F; which now is ambiguous
because consumption smoothing over time is di¢ cult. If there is virtually no uncertainty (as
it is typically the case in the standard child labour literature), there are high indirect costs of
schooling such that (eb   ea) is large, and the household is severely liquidity constrained such
that jU 00(c2)j >> jU 00(c3)j because second period consumption is smaller than third period
consumption, then the second term in F will dominate and the derivative becomes positive.
This positive e¤ect is strengthened the larger the immediate gains from child labour in period
2 that is the higher the indirect costs of schooling (eb   ea).
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